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Stratospheric injection of sulfate aerosols has been advocated as an emergency 
geoengineering measure to tackle dangerous climate change, or as a stopgap until 
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels are reduced. But it may not prove to be a game 
changer that some imagine. 
 
In the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, virtually all the world’s countries 
agreed to stabilize concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere at a level 
that would avoid dangerous climate change. Since then, however, international cooperation in 
limiting emissions has been ineffectual and concentrations have continued to rise. Recently, 
there has been more discussion of limiting climate change by geoengineering, a term taken 
here to be synonymous with solar radiation management, through the injection of sulfate 
aerosols in the stratosphere. The technique is even mentioned in the latest Intergovernmental 




Two powerful arguments have been made for using geoengineering: as an emergency 
measure
2
, and as a stopgap
3
. Here we analyse both proposals from two perspectives: (1) 
effectiveness (would the use of geoengineering achieve the stated goal?), and (2) political 
feasibility (is there a reasonable prospect that the international political system would allow 
geoengineering to be used to achieve the stated goal?). Our main conclusion is that, when the 
use of geoengineering is politically feasible, the intervention may not be effective; and that, 
when the use of geoengineering might be effective, its deployment may not be politically 
feasible. Upon careful reflection, geoengineering may not prove to be the game changer some 
people have taken it to be. 
 
Geoengineering’s effects 
Among the many options for ‘global dimming’ aimed at limiting global warming, the 
simplest involves putting sulfate aerosols in the stratosphere to scatter sunlight
4
. This form of 
geoengineering could reduce temperature in the lower atmosphere quickly. It would also be 
relatively inexpensive to deploy and could be done unilaterally, without the need for 
international cooperation. Ironically, however, this is one of the problems with 
geoengineering: 
its use might harm some countries (for example, by altering the monsoons) even if it were 
expected to help others. Geoengineering, particularly the use of stratospheric aerosols, poses 
a 
challenge for governance. 
 
Of all the arguments against geoengineering, perhaps the one most frequently advanced is 
that 
knowledge of geoengineering’s ability to cool the climate will reduce the incentive to cut 
emissions
5
. However, theory and laboratory experiments suggest that the failure to cut 
emissions can be explained by free-rider problems, including those associated with 
uncertainty about the true threshold for dangerous climate change6. Belief that 
geoengineering could serve as a cheap and quick fix might further dampen the incentive to 
cut emissions, but it seems unlikely that this belief will, by itself, cause concentrations to 
exceed dangerous levels. In any event, knowledge of geoengineering cannot be erased. 
 
It is important to understand that geoengineering cannot be used to preserve today’s climate. 
Sunlight scattering would act on shortwave radiation, and GHGss affect long-wave 
radiation. In theory, atmospheric aerosol injection could be used to limit mean global 
temperature change to a specific level, such as 2 
increase. However, it could not be used to limit changes in temperature and precipitation 
independently
7
. Moreover, no matter how geoengineering might be targeted, it could not 
preserve the spatial distribution of either temperature or precipitation, let alone the historical 
pattern of ocean circulation
7
.  Finally, geoengineering would have environmental effects 
unrelated to the climate. Some of these, such as stratospheric ozone depletion2, are 
reasonably well understood, but geoengineering might have other effects that are currently 
unknown. A climate disturbed by elevated CO2 concentrations and geoengineering would be 
very different from the current climate (see Fig. 1). How human societies behave in this 
altered environment will also matter. For example, though the combination of CO2-
fertilization and global dimming might increase agricultural yields for certain crops on a 
global scale8, the local effects are likely to be highly variable, with uncertain implications for 
land use change, crop selection, and food prices. 
 
Averting disaster 
Would geoengineering be useful as a last resort? The idea seems comforting, but what kind of 
emergency could be prevented or alleviated by geoengineering? Stratospheric injection of 
sulphate aerosols would cool surface air temperatures quickly, but if the West Antarctic Ice 
Sheet were to disintegrate, the cause would likely be oceanic rather than atmospheric 
warming, and it would take centuries for geoengineering to reverse the process leading to this 
catastrophic collapse
9
. Sunlight scattering would also be ineffective in addressing other polar 
climate emergencies, not least because it cannot directly or quickly affect temperature in the 
polar winter
10
. Geoengineering could probably help to reduce melting of the Greenland Ice 
Sheet
11
 and rises in sea level, but these are slow processes that might be better addressed by 
adaptation, which can also be done unilaterally but without creating significant new risks or 
arousing geopolitical tensions. 
 
A related problem is the timing of deployment. If countries waited too long before 
intervening, 
some geophysical processes might prove impossible to reverse. Early warning signals could 
help to avert some catastrophes
12
. However, early warnings might be unreliable or come too 
late to allow geoengineering to avoid catastrophic climate change
13
. A case could be made for 
using geoengineering before any warning signs appeared, to avoid crossing an approaching 
but uncertain climate tipping point. However, doing so would introduce new dangers (Fig. 1), 
and it is not clear that the reduction in climate change hazards would justify the risks 
associated with geoengineering. It is also not clear that countries would approve the use of 
geoengineering as a precautionary approach to addressing climate change. 
 
The temptation to use geoengineering to address a regional emergency, such as an altered 
monsoon, might be harder to resist. However, geoengineering could not be counted on to 
prevent every regional climate crisis. For example, it probably could not prevent Amazonian 
forest dieback due to drought conditions. Moreover, countries that expect to be harmed by 
geoengineering would surely act to prevent it from being used. They might offer assistance to 
the countries contemplating the use of geoengineering, in exchange for these countries 
agreeing to refrain from deployment. They might also threaten trade sanctions, a military 
response, or 
use of counter-geoengineering—the injection of particles designed to warm rather than 
to cool the Earth. Geoengineering might prove more acceptable if, by agreement, any ‘losers’ 
were to be compensated for their losses. However, attributing particular changes to 
geoengineering rather than to natural variation would be difficult if not impossible. 
 
Buying time 
Should geoengineering be used as a stopgap? The idea in this case would be to deploy 
stratospheric aerosol injection soon, initially at a low level, and then to turn it up gradually 
over time, the goal being to limit temperature change while more effort is put into abating 
emissions and developing new technologies for reducing emissions3. Once concentrations 
had returned to a ‘safe’ level, geoengineering could be scaled back and eventually stopped. 
This approach would limit the risk of climate change while also limiting the risk of 
geoengineering. However, the assumption that countries will overcome free rider incentives 
when geoengineering is used, despite having failed to do so when geoengineering was not 
used, seems implausible. The proposal to use geoengineering as a stopgap lacks credibility. 
 
Indeed, it seems at least as likely that, rather than scale back the use of geoengineering, 
countries might instead choose to adapt to the combined effects of both climate change and 
geoengineering. Liming might be used to protect sensitive coral ecosystems from future 
ocean 
acidification. Commercially important fish species might be engineered to withstand warmer 
ocean temperatures
14
. Crops might be engineered to benefit both from higher CO2 
concentrations and from the more diffused light created by sunlight scattering. Use of one 
form of geoengineering might only beget the use of a multiple of other forms of ‘nature 
engineering’. 
 
If geoengineering were used over a number of decades, and GHG concentrations 
continued to rise all the while, turning geoengineering off abruptly would cause rapid climate 
change
1
. It seems more likely, however, that countries will someday cut the amount of 
reflective aerosols currently emitted by fossil fuel burning, causing regional temperatures to 
rise. In this situation, the ability of sunlight scattering to lower temperatures rapidly could be 
an advantage. The bigger risk to using geoengineering, we believe, is not that countries will 
turn it off abruptly but that, having begun to use it, they will continue to use it and may even 
become addicted to it. 
 
Thinking again 
Analysis of the possible use of solar radiation management in plausible scenarios (see Table 
1) 
suggests that, when its use is politically feasible, geoengineering may not be effective; and 
that, when its use might be effective, its deployment may not be politically feasible. The 
many 
problems with geoengineering—its inability to address every ‘climate emergency’,  the risks 
associated with its use, the geopolitical problems that would be triggered by its use, and the 
prospect of its use becoming addictive—all suggest that contemplation of geoengineering 
does 
little to diminish the need to address the root causes of climate change. If anything, the 
prospect of geoengineering should strengthen the resolve to tackle climate change by limiting 
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Figure 1. Solar radiation management using sulphate aerosols: ecological effects. 
 
The schematic shows change in the drivers of ecosystem responses that are likely to arise 
from using sulfate aerosols, compared with not using sulfate aerosols, given current trends of 
increasing GHG concentrations, and the probable ecosystem responses. Drivers that are likely 
to change include temperature, precipitation, irradiance, monsoons, and sulfate deposition
15
. 
Ecosystem responses will be complex, with implications for food production, freshwater 
supplies, soil and water chemistry, and human health. They will also be spatially variable, 
creating both winners and losers, and uncertain, possibly causing large changes in ecosystems 
and in the availability of resources. 
 
 
 
